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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
                     
 
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 
  The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and 
Enforcement Act of 1989 ("FIRREA") authorizes the Resolution 
Trust Corporation ("RTC") to remove certain actions from state 
court to federal court: 
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 The Corporation, in any capacity and 
without bond or security, may remove any 
action, suit, or proceeding from a State 
court to the United States district court 
with jurisdiction over the place where the 
action, suit, or proceeding is pending, to 
the United States district court for the 
District of Columbia, or to the United States 
district court with jurisdiction over the 
principal place of business of any 
institution for which the Corporation has 
been appointed conservator or receiver if the 
action, suit, or proceeding is brought 
against the institution or the Corporation as 
conservator or receiver of such institution. 
The removal of any such suit or proceeding 
shall be instituted-- 
 
     (i)not later than 90 days 
after the date the Corporation is 
substituted as a party, or 
 
     (ii) not later than 30 days 
after service on the Corporation, 
if the Corporation is named as a 
party in any capacity and if such 
suit is filed after August 9, 1989. 
 
12 U.S.C. § 1441a(l)(3)(A).  This case requires us to review a 
district court's application of FIRREA's RTC removal provision to 
an action by a borrower against a savings bank (now under RTC 
receivership) and its directors.  We find the district court's 
result correct and will affirm. 
     
I. 
 Spring Garden Associates ("Spring Garden") filed this 
suit in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas against Bell 
Saving Bank ("Bell") and its directors, following a dispute over 
a $9 million loan from Bell to Spring Garden.  The five-count 
complaint sought preliminary and permanent injunctive relief 
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prohibiting Bell from foreclosing on the loan, specific 
performance of the loan agreement, and damages for Bell's alleged 
failure to extend credit under that agreement.0  The court of 
common pleas entered a "Temporary Restraining Order"0 against all 
of the defendants. 
 In March 1991, the Treasury Department's Office of 
Thrift Supervision appointed the RTC conservator and, later, 
receiver of Bell.  On January 12, 1993, the RTC filed a petition 
for substitution with the court of common pleas.  This petition 
was followed on January 14, 1993, by removal of the case to the 
district court pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1441a(l)(3).  The RTC then 
filed a motion in district court to vacate the state court 
injunction, arguing that 12 U.S.C. § 1821(j) expressly prohibited 
injunctions against the RTC.   
 Before the district court ruled on the RTC's motion, 
Spring Garden filed a motion to remand to state court.  Spring 
Garden argued that the RTC had failed to file its notice of 
removal within the time limit provided by 12 U.S.C.  
§ 1441a(l)(3).  Spring Garden further urged that 12 U.S.C.  
                     
0Count I alleged breach of contract by Bell. Count II requested 
preliminary and permanent injunctive relief against Bell to 
prohibit foreclosure on the loan. Count III alleged intentional 
or negligent misrepresentation by Bell and its directors. Count 
IV alleged breach of fiduciary duty by Bell. Count V contained a 
promissory estoppel claim against Bell and its directors. 
0The order entered by the court of common pleas is more properly 
termed a preliminary injunction than a temporary restraining 
order. It was issued upon notice to all parties, following a 
hearing, and was, by its terms, to be in effect for an indefinite 
period. 
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§ 1441a(l)(1), the statute conferring original jurisdiction on 
the district courts in RTC cases,0 did not confer federal 
jurisdiction over its claims against Bell's directors and, 
accordingly, that the case had been improperly removed.   
 The district court denied Spring Garden's motion to 
remand and granted the RTC's motion to vacate the injunction. The 
dissolution of the state court injunction was based on 12 U.S.C. 
§ 1821(j), which substantially restricts the authority of a court 
to enter an injunction against the RTC.0  Spring Garden now 
appeals. 
 
II.   
 We begin by inquiring whether our appellate 
jurisdiction extends to a review of the district court's order 
dissolving the state court's injunction.  Under 28 U.S.C.  
§ 1292(a)(1), this court has jurisdiction to review orders of 
district courts "dissolving injunctions."  Spring Garden has 
                     
012 U.S.C. § 1441a(l)(1) provides: 
 
 Notwithstanding any other provision of 
law, any civil action, suit, or proceeding to 
which the Corporation is a party shall be 
deemed to arise under the laws of the United 
States, and the United States district courts 
shall have original jurisdiction over such 
action, suit, or proceeding. 
012 U.S.C. § 1821(j) provides: 
 
 Except as provided in this section, no 
court may take any action, except at the 
request of the Board of Directors by 
regulation or order, to restrain or affect 
the exercise of powers or functions of the 
Corporation as a conservator or a receiver. 
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challenged the portion of the order vacating the injunction, and 
28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) thus gives us appellate jurisdiction to 
review that portion of the district court's order, even though 
that order is not final. 
 As for the district court's denial of a remand, neither 
28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 nor 28 U.S.C. § 1292 expressly confers 
jurisdiction on this court to review orders denying a remand to a 
state court.  See Aberle Hosiery Co. v. American Arbitration 
Ass'n, 461 F.2d 1005, 1006 (3d Cir. 1972); Albright v. R. J. 
Reynolds Tobacco Co., 531 F.2d 132, 134 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 
426 U.S. 907 (1976).  In this case, nevertheless, we can review 
the denial of a remand because that portion of the district 
court's order is "closely intertwined" with the portion of that 
order dissolving the injunction.  Ortiz v. Eichler, 794 F.2d 889, 
892 (3d Cir. 1986).  We therefore conclude we have appellate 
jurisdiction to review both portions of the district court's 
order. 
 In so concluding, we reject the RTC's contention that 
28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) bars review of the order denying remand. 
While § 1447(d) precludes an appeal of an order granting remand, 
that statute does not prohibit appellate review of orders denying 
remand.  See Aliota v. Graham, 984 F.2d 1350, 1353 (3d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 68 (1993) (28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) only 
concerns appellate review of "[a]n order remanding a case to the 
State court from which it was removed"); see also Doe v. American 
Red Cross, 14 F.3d 196, 199 (3d Cir. 1993) ("It is axiomatic that 
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remanding a case to state court terminates the jurisdiction of a 
. . . district court over that case.").  
 
III. 
 We next look to whether the district court had 
jurisdiction to enter its order.  See Employers Insurance of 
Wausau v. Crown Cork & Seal Co. Inc., 905 F.2d 42, 45 (3d Cir. 
1990) ("every federal appellate court has a special obligation to 
satisfy itself not only of its own jurisdiction, but also that of 
the lower courts in a cause under review").   
 Section 1441a(l)(3) authorizes the RTC to remove any 
"action, suit or proceeding from a state court to" a United 
States district court "with jurisdiction over" designated places. 
Section 1441a(l)(1) confers original jurisdiction on United 
States district courts to hear cases involving the RTC:  
 Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any civil 
action, suit, or proceeding to which the Corporation is a party 
shall be deemed to arise under the laws of the United States, and 
the United States district courts shall have original 
jurisdiction over such action, suit or proceeding. 
 
 Both Spring Garden and the RTC accept the proposition 
that § 1441a(l)(3) authorizes the RTC to remove cases over which 
the district court would have original jurisdiction under  
§ 1441a(l)(1).  They then part ways.  The RTC insists that  
§ 1441a(l)(1) confers original federal jurisdiction over all the 
claims asserted in Spring Garden's state court action.  Spring 
Garden, on the other hand, argues that this section confers 
original federal jurisdiction only over the claims against Bell 
and not over its claims against Bell's directors. 
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 We confess that we have some difficulty understanding 
Spring Garden's legal analysis of the removal jurisdiction issue. 
Spring Garden contends in its brief that (1) 12 U.S.C.  
§ 1441a(l)(1) "only states that federal question jurisdiction is 
applicable to any claim to which the RTC is a party," (Brief, p. 
12) (emphasis added); (2) under the general removal statute, 28 
U.S.C. § 1441, district courts can exercise jurisdiction over 
pendent claims as well as federal question claims, but "the 
district court could not invoke pendant jurisdiction over Spring 
Garden's action against the officers of Bell" who would be 
impermissible pendant parties (Brief, p. 18); (3) the only 
situation in which a suit including both removable claims and 
non-removable claims can be removed to a district court is the 
one described in subsection (c) of the general removal statute, 
28 U.S.C. § 1441(c)0, and, under that subsection, removal can 
occur only if the removable claim is "separate and independent" 
of the non-removable claims; and (5) since Spring Garden's claim 
against Bell is not "separate and independent" of its claims 
against the officers of Bell, there was no authority to remove 
any of the claims asserted in the state court and the district 
                     
028 U.S.C. § 1441(c) provides: 
 
 (c) Whenever a separate and independent 
claim or cause of action within the 
jurisdiction conferred by section 1331 of 
this title is joined with one or more 
otherwise non-removable claims or causes of 
action, the entire case may be removed and 
the district court may determine all issues 
therein, or, in its discretion, may remand 
all matters in which State law predominates. 
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court had no removal jurisdiction.  (Brief, pp. 18-20.)  We have 
a number of difficulties with Spring Garden's analysis, but it 
will suffice for present purposes to indicate that we find its 
first step fatally flawed. 
 The proper starting point of our inquiry is, of course, 
the language of 28 U.S.C. § 1441a(l)(1) itself.  See Smith v. 
Fidelity Consumer Discount Co., 898 F.2d 907, 909-10 (3d Cir. 
1990) ("'[t]here is, of course, no more persuasive evidence of 
the purpose of a statute than the words by which the legislature 
undertook to give expression to its wishes.'")  Section 
1441a(l)(1) does not confer original federal jurisdiction over 
"any claim" asserted by or against the RTC, as Spring Garden 
insists.  Rather, it confers original federal jurisdiction over 
"any action, suit or proceeding to which the [RTC] is a party." 
We believe the commonly understood meaning of the wording of that 
phrase encompasses the entirety of any case to which the RTC is a 
party and not just those claims in such a case brought by or 
against the RTC. 
 Cases from two other Courts of Appeal agree with our 
common parlance reading of § 1441a(l)(1).  In People of State of 
Cal. By and Through Lungren v. Keating, 986 F.2d 346 (9th Cir. 
1993), the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that, 
notwithstanding the fact that the general removal statute would 
not have permitted any of the claims in the complaint to be 
removed to federal court, the addition of the RTC as a party 
"transforms the entire action into one that 'arises under' the 
laws of the United States."  Id. at 347-48.  The court determined 
10 
that "[t]he words 'action, suit, or proceeding' are not limited 
to specific claims, but are synonymous with the term 'case' in 
the constitutional sense."  Id. at 348.   
 In Kansas Pub. Employees Retirement Sys. v. Reimer & 
Koger Assocs., Inc., 4 F.3d 614 (8th Cir. 1993), the Court of 
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit agreed with the Keating court's 
interpretation of § 1441a(l)(1).  The court was there required to 
address whether a state court had violated the Constitution's 
Supremacy Clause by severing the case before it in order to 
preclude the RTC from removing the entire case.  Id. at 618.  The 
court of appeals held that because "the RTC had the right to 
remove 'the entire case' to federal court," id. (citing Keating, 
986 F.2d at 348-49), the state court's actions had run afoul of 
the Supremacy Clause, id. at 619.0  
 Further support of our reading of § 1441a(1)(1) is 
provided by cases that have addressed the similar language0 of 12 
U.S.C. § 1819(b)(2)(A), which provides: 
. . . all suits of a civil nature at common 
law or in equity to which the [FDIC], in any 
                     
0While the issue raised here by Spring Garden has never before 
been argued to this court, we have expressed views in passing 
similar to those of the Courts of Appeals for the Ninth and 
Eighth Circuits.  In Adams v. Madison Realty & Dev., Inc., 937 
F.2d 845, 855 (3d Cir. 1991), we stated:  "Under 12 U.S.C.  
§ 1441a(l)(1), any civil action in which the RTC is a party is 
deemed to arise under federal law."  And in Resolution Trust 
Corp. v. Nernberg, 3 F.3d 62, 68 n.3 (3d Cir. 1993), we remarked 
on the broad scope of 28 U.S.C. § 1441a(l)(1):  "The language of 
the statute thus allows Resolution Trust to remove routine 
collection and foreclosure cases to the already overburdened 
federal courts." 
0See Resolution Trust Corp. v. Nernberg, 3 F.3d 62, 66 n.2 (3d 
Cir. 1993) (noting "close parallel" between enabling statutes of 
RTC and FDIC). 
11 
capacity, is a party shall be deemed to arise 
under the laws of the United States. 
 
In National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. Baker & 
McKenzie, 997 F.2d 305 (7th Cir. 1993), an insurer, seeking a 
declaration that it was not liable under a malpractice policy, 
sued three lawyers whom it had insured, their law firm, and the 
FDIC, which was now a receiver for one of their former clients. 
The court noted that the FDIC's "presence as a party conferred 
federal jurisdiction over the suit" pursuant to § 1819(b)(2)(A). 
Also helpful is Walker v. F.D.I.C., 970 F.2d 114 (5th Cir. 1992), 
in which developers sued a savings and loan and its directors in 
state court after the savings and loan failed to provide a loan. 
After the savings and loan became insolvent, the FSLIC was 
appointed receiver and added as a party to the lawsuit.  The FDIC 
was later substituted for the FSLIC and the action was removed to 
federal court under § 1819(b)(2)(A).  The court approved of the 
removal, noting that "where the FDIC is a party, federal question 
jurisdiction exists and removal by the FDIC is proper."  Id. at 
118.  The court also noted that settlement of the developers' 
claims against the FDIC did not oust the federal court of 
jurisdiction to consider the developers' claims against the 
directors.  Id. at 119.0     
                     
0See also Buckner v. F.D.I.C., 981 F.2d 816, 819 (5th Cir. 1993) 
("as the FDIC is a party to a civil suit, that suit is 
conclusively presumed to arise under the laws of the United 
States, and thus is within the original subject matter 
jurisdiction of the proper federal district court"); Matter of 
Meyerland Co., 960 F.2d 512, 515 (5th Cir. 1992) (in banc), cert. 
denied, 113 S. Ct. 967 (1993) ("Access to federal courts in all 
actions to which it is a party allows the FDIC to develop and 
rely on a national and uniform body of law . . ."); cf. American 
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 Further and finally, we find support for our reading of 
the relevant statute in the Supreme Court's decision in Finley v. 
United States, 490 U.S. 545 (1989).  The court there examined 28 
U.S.C. § 1346(b), the jurisdictional provision of the Federal 
Tort Claims Act ("FTCA").  In interpreting the reach of the FTCA 
to include only claims against the United States and not any suit 
in which such a claim is asserted, the court wrote: 
The FTCA, § 1346(b), confers jurisdiction 
over "civil actions on claims against the 
United States."  It does not say "civil 
actions on claims that include requested 
relief against the United States," nor "civil 
actions in which there is a claim against the 
United States" -- formulations one might 
expect if the presence of a claim against the 
United States constituted merely a minimum 
jurisdictional requirement, rather than a 
definition of the permissible scope of the 
FTCA actions.  Just as the statutory 
provision "between . . . citizens of 
different States" has been held to mean 
citizens of different states and no one else, 
. . . so also here we conclude that "against 
the United States" means against the United 
States and no one else. 
 
Id. at 552. 
 
                                                                  
National Red Cross v. S.G., __ U.S. __, 112 S.Ct. 2465 (1992) 
(holding "sue and be sued" provision of Red Cross charter to 
confer original federal jurisdiction over all cases to which Red 
Cross is a party and finding such jurisdictional grants to be 
well within Article III limits); Kirkbride v. Continental 
Casualty Co., 933 F.2d 729, 731-32 (9th Cir. 1991) ("the grant of 
subject matter jurisdiction contained in [the] FDIC's removal 
statute evidences Congress' desire that cases involving [the] 
FDIC should generally be heard and decided by the federal 
courts").  
13 
 The statutory language of § 1441a(l)(1) differs from 
that of § 1346(b) in much the same way as the hypothetical 
statutory text in the Finley court's analysis differs from  
§ 1346(b) --  "civil actions, suits, or proceedings to which the 
Corporation is a party" is very close to "civil actions in which 
there is a claim against the United States."  The common usage 
reading of § 1346(b) in Finley thus supports the conclusion that 
the language Congress chose in § 1441a(l)(1) evidences an intent 
to confer original jurisdiction on the federal courts over the 
entire case to which the RTC has become a party.   
 As Spring Garden apparently concedes, if 12 U.S.C.  
§ 1441a(l)(1) does in fact provide federal jurisdiction over all 
the claims contained in a case, as we believe it does, there is 
no need to inquire as to pendent jurisdiction or pendant parties. 
Accordingly, we hold that 12 U.S.C. §§ 1441a(l)(1) and (3) 
authorized removal of the entire case. 
 
IV. 
 Under 12 U.S.C. § 1441a(l)(3)(A)(i), the RTC may remove 
a suit from a state court to a federal court "not later than 90 
days after the date [it] is substituted for a party."  
"Substitution" is defined for this purpose as the time when 
either: (1) the RTC or another party files a copy of the order 
appointing the RTC as conservator or receiver with the court in 
which the suit is pending, or (2) the RTC or another party files 
another pleading with the court in which the suit is pending 
informing the court that the RTC has been appointed.  12 U.S.C.  
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§ 1441a(l)(3)(B).  See Resolution Trust Corp. v. Bakker, 801 F. 
Supp. 706, 707 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (pursuant to amended version of  
§ 1441a(l)(3)(B), substitution occurred when RTC filed notice of 
substitution, not when it was appointed receiver). 
 On January 12, 1993, the RTC filed a notice of 
substitution with the state court.  Two days later, on January 
14, 1993, the RTC removed the case to the district court.  We 
therefore conclude that the RTC removed the action in a timely 
fashion under 12 U.S.C. §§ 1441a(l)(3)(A) and (B).  Since Spring 
Garden does not challenge before us the district court's 
conclusion that the state court's injunction was inconsistent 
with the provisions of 12 U.S.C. § 1821(j), it follows that the 
order appealed from must be sustained in all respects. 
 
V. 
 The RTC's removal was timely and the district court 
properly exercised jurisdiction over all claims against all 
parties to this suit pursuant to 12 U.S.C. §§ 1441a(l)(1) and 
(3).  We therefore will affirm the district court's order of 
March 16, 1993. 
 
                                    
